Standards of Proof and Admissibility in Juvenile Court Proceedings by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1969
Standards of Proof and Admissibility in Juvenile
Court Proceedings
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Standards of Proof and Admissibility in Juvenile Court Proceedings" (1969). Minnesota Law Review.
2955.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2955
Standards of Proof and Admissibility
in Juvenile Court Proceedings
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments, led by the Supreme Court's decision
in In re Gault,' have brought drastic changes to the juvenile
court. That decision, which required certain due process pro-
tections for juveniles, has resulted in adversary procedures re-
placing less formal and less protective procedures in the juvenile
courts.2 This Note will deal with two closely related subjects
on the threshold of this movement toward adversary procedure
-the required degree of proof and admissibility of evidence-
and the means chosen by the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules to
deal with them. Neither the degree of proof required nor the
proper evidentiary standards have been directly addressed by the
Supreme Court, and both are matters of dispute.
These subjects must be considered in the context of an en-
tire process specially created for dealing with juveniles. No
attempt will be made to describe the entire system, but the differ-
ent types of hearings in which the problems of degree of proof
and admissibility arise require description. The first of these
hearings is the detention hearing.3 :It may occur in any juvenile
cause but occurs most frequently in delinquency causes when
the county attorney feels the juvenile should be detained pend-
ing further action rather than released to the custody of his par-
ents or guardian. The second is the reference hearing, which
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Founders of the juvenile court system envisioned the state as
the father of all delinquent, dependent and neglected children, and ac-
cordingly intended to offer humane and informal treatment, rather than
the harsh methods of criminal punishment. See Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909). Because of a belief that the juve-
nile was getting the "worst of both worlds," (Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 556 (1966)), the Supreme Court held in Gault that the juvenile
is protected by certain due process requirements.
The changes required to meet the demandi of Gault are funda-
mental, for the decision announces a change in the emphasis
of the juvenile court proceeding. No longer is the hearing to
be simply a friendly conference marked chiefly by its in-formality. Hereafter it should be EL legal proceeding at which
evidence is taken and an adjudication made upon the facts
found ....
Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Re-
appraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700, 1700-01 (1967).
3. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE
MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS, art. 7 (1969), as amended, (Supp.
Sept. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MJCR].
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occurs only in delinquency and traffic offender causes.4 Here
the question is whether the juvenile should be dealt with by the
juvenile court system or be referred for prosecution as an adult.
This type of hearing occurs only upon request of either the
juvenile or the county attorney.5 The third type of hearing is
the adjudicatory hearing6-the juvenile court equivalent of a
trial. Its purpose is to determine whether or not the child is
delinquent, neglected, dependent, a traffic offender or whether
there should be a termination of parental rights. If the adjudi-
catory hearing answers in the affirmative, a dispositional hear-
ing is held to decide which of the available remedies should be
applied.7
At each of these hearings, the court is required to make
findings of fact 8 and must apply some standard of proof. Like-
wise, at each of the hearings, the court must hear evidence 9 and
therefore must employ some standard of admissibility. However,
differences in form and purpose among the types of hearings
may require different standards of proof and admissibility for
each. This Note will discuss the 1innesota Rules in relation to
the appropriate standards of proof and admissibility.
II. THE DEGREE OF PROOF
A. ThE CONCEPT
The degree or quantum of proof required for a decision is
often spoken of as the burden of proof. It must be carefully
distinguished from the more usual usages of "burden of proof"
which refer to the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion. The burden of production is the party's duty to
produce enough evidence to be able to withstand a motion for a
directed verdict. This burden may shift during the course of
trial as one side and then the other presents evidence which is
sufficient to support its point of view.10 The burden of per-
suasion, however, does not shift from one party to the other but
4. MJCR art. 7.
5. MJCR 8-1(1).
6. MJCR art. 5.
7. MJCR art 6.
8. MJCR 5-4(1) (a) (adjudicatory hearing); MJCR 6-6 (dispo-
sitional hearing); MJCR 7-3 (3) (e) (detention hearing); MJCR 8-7(1)
(b) (reference hearing).
9. MJCR 5-2, 6-4, 7-3(3) (b), 8-5.
10. C. McCoRMvac, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 306 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McCoavncK].
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remains on the party-usually the plaintiff-initially charged
with the burden. He must convince the trier of fact that his
version of the facts is the true one; any doubts will be re-
solved against him." The degree of proof, on the other hand,
refers to the question of how much more likely one version of
the facts is than the other. This does not change during the
litigation, but is determined by the type of issue being tried,
12
and applies to both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion.
There are three basic degrees of proof which are generally
employed: proof by preponderance of the evidence, proof by
clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 3 The requirement of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence is the most common quantum of proof imposed in civil
litigation.14 This degree of proof has been defined in Ainnesota
as that degree of evidence on a disputed fact which "ordinarily
satisifes an unprejudiced mind of its existence."' 5  Perhaps a
more realistic and acceptable definition is proof which induces
belief "that the existence of the contested fact is more probable
than its non-existence."' 6  The second degree of proof-proof
by clear and convincing evidence-is generally employed in
special types of civil cases where public policy demands that a
greater degree of certainty attach to a resolution of the issue in
favor of the proponent.17 This standard has been variously ex-
pressed by the courts' s but exact definition has proven difficult.
11. Id. § 307.
12. Id. § 318.
13. It has been suggested that the first two are qualitatively as
well as quantitatively different from the third in that they make the
verdict depend on a balancing of the evidence while the third empha-
sizes the state of the jurors' minds. M.CCORMIC, supra note 10, § 319.
See also Morgan, Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 HARv. L. REV. 59, 64 (1933).
14. See generally McCoRmvcK, supra note 10, § 319.
15. Karson v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 29 Minn. 12, 15, 11 N.W.
122, 123 (1881).
16. MCCORMCK, supra note 10, § 319.
17. See Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S.
276, 285 (1966). See generally MCCORM CK, supra note 10, § 320;
9 J. WIGMORE, EVInENcE § 2498 (2d ed. 1947).
18. See Frazier v. Loftin, 200 Ark. 4, 8, 137 S.W.2d 750, 752 (1940)
("clear, cogent, and convincing"); Lynch v. Lichtenthaler, 85 Cal. App.
2d 437, 441, 193 P.2d 77, 80 (1948) ("clear and convincing evidence");
Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468, 475, 175 P.2d 470, 473 (1946) ("clear,
unequivocal, satisfactory and convincing"); In re William's Will, 256
Wis. 338, 345, 41 N.W.2d 191, 194 (1950) ("clear, convincing and satis-
factory").
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There is no doubt, however, that the standard is somewhere be-
tween proof by a preponderance of the evidence and proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps the best definition is that the
affirmative of the issue is highly probable.' 9 Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which is required in
virtually all criminal offenses, regardless of their seriousness. 20
Although a definition may be given if requested by the jury,21
it is generally preferred that the court offer no definition since
the term is thought to be commonly understood.22
The question of whether or not the degree of proof required
has any impact on the outcome has been discussed elsewhere
and will not be dealt with here.23 Suffice it to say that virtually
all courts view the issue as important and will reverse when an
erroneous standard is applied.24
B. TnE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN THE Juvmn COURTS
1. Generally
Juvenile court proceedings have usually been considered civil
in nature rather than criminal. 25 As a result, the degree of proof
19. McBain, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Beliefs, 32 CAIF. L. REv.
242, 246, 253-54 (1944).
20. See generally McCoRmvcK, supra note 10, § 321.
21. State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 57 N.W. 652 (1894).
22. State v. Whitman, 168 Minn. 305, 210 N.W. 12 (1926).
23. Morgan, supra note 13, at 59.
24. E.g., In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968). An
example of a situation where the standard of proof might make a differ-
ence is not difficult to contrive. In a suit to have a child declared
delinquent because he is "wayward," the only evidence presented
might be the father's testimony that the child frequently runs away
from home and the child's testimony, cogently given, that he has never
run away. In such a situation, there might be a preponderance of the
evidence against the child because of the parent's greater maturity and
presumably greater responsibility, but it would be difficult to say that
the evidence was "clear and convincing" or that it would prove delin-
quency "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Now suppose that both the father and mother testified that the
child ran away and the child again testified to the contrary. It would
seem that because the parents corroborate each other, the evidence is
"clear and convicing" against the juvenile. However, because of the
possibility that the parents are seeking to use the delinquency pro-
ceeding to terminate their responsibility for the child, it may be that
their evidence alone would not constitute proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
25. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 & n.12, app. A (D.C.
Cir. 1959). In a compilation of cases from all jurisdictions, the court
points out that 42 jurisdictions have held the juvenile proceeding to
be civil in nature.
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required in civil cases-a preponderance of the evidence-has
generally been held to be the appropriate standard to be used in
juvenile proceedings. 26
2. Recent Developments
Critical attention to the degree of proof required in juvenile
courts has heretofore been directel almost exclusively to ad-
judicatory hearings in delinquency cases based on a violation
of the criminal law. Moreover, such comment has, until Gault,
viewed the question as one of policy rather than constitutional
requirement.27 One conclusion is that the preponderance stand-
ard adopted by the majority is unwise because it fails to recog-
nize that juvenile adjudications, even though civil in nature, are
"9of special gravity."28  A reasonable doubt standard does not
necessarily follow, however. As one noted commentator ob-
served:
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" is a device to prevent punishment
in the wrong cases. In a juvenile case, the aim is not punish-
ment but rehabilitation; the risk of failure to act may be greater
than the risk of acting too quickly. This is not to say that evi-
dence is not needed, but merely that the consequences of error
are not quite so serious in a juvenile case and therefore we need
not be quite so cautious. 29
These considerations have led other commentators to take a mid-
die of the road position and recommend a requirement of "clear
and convincing proof."30 At most, however, this recommendation
26. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF TnE NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND EViDENCE IN THE JUVENILE COURT
68 (1962) [hereinafter cited as NCCD]. E.g., United States v. Borders,
154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957); Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398,
118 So. 184 (1928); Re Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W.2d 674 (1959);
People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
709 (1903); State v. Thompson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955);
State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 1.39 Wash. 1, 245 P. 409 (1926);
In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Mun. Ct. of App. 1959); In re
Yardley, 260 Iowa 259, 149 N.W.2d 162 (1967); In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d
194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1963). But see Tn re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12,
251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931); In re Rich, 86 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
27. E.g., NCCD, supra note 26, at 68-72; U.S. CHmREN'S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T HEW, STANDARDS FOR JuvENn= AND FAMmY COURTS 72 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Of-fender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 562-63 (1957).
28. NCCD, supra note 26, at 68.
29. Paulsen, supra note 27, at 563.
30. NCCD, supra note 26, at 68; STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 72. It
is interesting to note that this was the standard used by the Arizona
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), rev'd
on other grounds 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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has been limited to delinquency proceedings based on a violation
of criminal law.3 1
Since Gault, the constitutionality as well as the wisdom of
the preponderance of the evidence standard has come into ques-
tion. Even though the question was expressly avoided in Gault32
and was denied review on another occasion,3 3 one commentator
has concluded that:
Although a higher standard of proof than a mere preponderance
of evidence may soon be required in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings, it is unlikely that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
will be deemed essential.34
However, some recent decisions disagree. In the leading
case of In re Urbasek,3 5 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
when a child is tried in a juvenile court for an offense which is a
crime as to adults, delinquency must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. Robert Urbasek, 11 years old, was brought to
the juvenile hearing under a charge that he murdered an 11
year old girl. The juvenile court adjudged him delinquent under
a state statute which required only a preponderance of the evi-
dence for such an adjudication. 0 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Illinois dismissed the argument that a juvenile hearing is a
civil proceeding rather than a criminal one, saying,
When we eschew legal fictions and adopt a realistic view of
the consequences that attach to a determination of delinquency
and a commitment to a juvenile detention home, . . . we can
neither truthfully nor fairly say that such an institution is de-
void of penal characteristics .... [T]he incarcerated juveniles'
liberty of action is restrained just as effectively as that of the
adult inmates serving terms in State and Federal prisons.37
The court then found the statute unconstitutional on the basis of
Gault even though that decision did not expressly require it. The
court felt that the "spirit" of Gault, together with the equal
protection and due process clauses, required the same procedural
protections for juveniles as afforded to adults who had committed
the same crime.3 8
31. NCCD, supra note 26, at 68; STANnARDS, supra note 27, at 72.
32. 387 U.S. at 11 n.7.
33. In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968).
34. Ketcham, supra note 1, at 1713; In re Urbasek, 38 IM. 2d 535, 232
N.E.2d 716 (1968).
35. 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968). See also United States v.
Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968); Santana v. State, 431 S.W.2d 558
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-4 & 704-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1969).
37. 38 Ill. 2d at 540, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
38. We need not be reminded that the Gault decision did not
pass upon the precise question of the quantum of proof....
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Urbasek was not the first case to require proof of delin-
quency beyond a reasonable doubt,39 but it was the first to place
the decision squarely on constitutional grounds. Since that time,
Texas has followed the Urbasek decision in Santana v. State40
and the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Costanzo,4 1 has
adopted the same rationale in a federal juvenile proceeding.
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
chosen to follow an earlier federal case42 and apply the pre-
ponderance standard43 so the question is certainly not settled
in the federal courts.
Urbasek and its progeny rest on both due process and equal
protection clauses44 and the relative merits of these two grounds
deserve attention. Each of the "hree cases rejects the no-
tion that constitutional protections need not apply because
a juvenile adjudication is not criminal, since the consequences
of an adjudication of delinquency are essentially the same as
those for conviction of a crime. This type of reasoning may be
read in either of two ways. The due process ground is that since
the due process clause requires certain protections for adults,
and because the clause also applies to juveniles, it must afford
them the same protections. The equal protection ground is the
argument that certain protections are afforded to adults-
whether required by due process or not-and since the same or
worse consequences may result from an adjudication of de-
linquency,45 these same protections must be afforded to children.
Each of the two grounds presents different problems and
may have different ramifications. If due process is the basis for
We believe, however, that the language of that opinion ex-
hibits a spirit that transcends the specific issues there in-
volved, and that in view thereof, it would not be consonant withdue process or equal protection to grant allegedly delinquentjuveniles the same procedural rights that protect adults charged
with crimes, while depriving these rights of their full efficacyby allowing a finding of delinquency upon a lesser standard of
proof than that required to sustain a criminal conviction.
Id. at 541-42.
39. See note 26 supra.
40. 431 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. :968).
41. 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968).
42. United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
43. In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
44. United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 445 (4th Cir. 1968);
In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 541-42, 232 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1968); Santana
v. State, 431 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
45. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where Gerald was commit-
ted for his minority (seven years) for a crime punishable by a $50 fine
to an adult.
[Vol. 54:362
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decision, there is some difficulty with the reasoning of the
opinions because no Supreme Court decision has squarely held
that the reasonable doubt standard is required even in adult
criminal cases. This may not be insurmountable, however, since
the Court has suggested that some such notion is constitution-
ally required.40 Moreover, it may well be that the presumption
of innocence is so strong as to make a lesser standard in-
congruous.
Although the due process clause may not go far enough to
justify imposition of the reasonable doubt standard, the equal
protection clause may go too far. It has been suggested that if
the equal protection clause is applied to this aspect of the juven-
ile proceeding it will necessarily require that all aspects of the
juvenile proceedings be identical to a criminal proceeding. This
reasoning ignores the fact that the equal protection clause will
only require identical treatment when there is no reasonable
justification for differentiation. 47 Thus, some special procedures
for juveniles may be justified by several factors including their
presumed susceptibility to rehabilitation and the control which
parents may exercise over them. However, the only apparent
justification for placing a lesser standard of proof on the state in
a delinquency proceeding than in a criminal one is that there is
less risk of harm involved in a wrong decision,48 and that notion
was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court in both Gault and
United States v. Kent.49
It is submitted that Urbasek, Santana and Costanzo
properly rest on both due process and equal protection
grounds. The reasonable doubt standard has long formed an
integral part of our judicial system50 which is premised on a
strong presumption of innocence.51  Altering the standard of
46. There is always in litigation a margin of error, represent-
ing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into
account. Where one party has at stake an interest of tran-
scending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this mar-
gin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the
other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in
the first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the con-
clusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due
process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the
Government has borne the burden of producing the evidence
and convincing the factfinder of his guilt.
Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
47. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
48. Paulsen, supra note 27, at 563.
49. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
50. McCORM~cK, supra note 10, § 321.
51. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1153 (1960).
1969]
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proof would dilute the strength of that presumption and
deny any accused-adult or juvenile-due process of law. Like-
wise, equal protection must insure that a juvenile will not incur
on the basis of less evidence the same consequences an adult
would incur for the same act. Mere labeling of the juvenile pro-
ceeding as "civil" will not suffice to avoid either argument.
C. TBE MnNSOTA JUvENIE COURT RULES
1. The Requirements of the Rules
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules provide for different de-
grees of proof depending on the nature of the proceeding. In a
hearing on reference for prosecution. the court must find
from clear and convincing evidence introduced at the reference
hearing, that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the
public safety would not be served under the provisions of laws
relating to juvenile courts52
in order to refer the child for prosecution as an adult. In
an adjudicatory hearing where the issue is the delinquency' 3
or traffic offense of the child,5 4 the degree required is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the issue in the adjudication
is neglect,55 dependency 50 or termination of parental rights,7
such a charge need only be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence. With few exceptions,58 these requirements impose a
higher degree of proof than pre-Gault decisions or statutes.
2. The Constitutional Sufficiency and Wisdom of the Rules
If Urbasek and its progeny are followed by the Supreme
Court, part of the Minnesota provisions will be constitutionally
required. However, these decisions, like Gault, are carefully cir-
cumscribed. They apply only to an adjudicatory hearing in
which a child is accused of an act which would be a crime if
committed by an adult.59 Such hearings are only one facet of
the juvenile court's jurisdiction.6 0
52. MJCR 8-7(2).
53. MJCR 5-4(1) (a).
54. MJCR 5-6(1) (a).
55. MJCR 5-5(1) (a).
56. MJCR 5-5(1) (a).
57. MJCR 5-7(1) (a).
58. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-3-6(6) (a) (1964).
59. United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 444 (4th Cir. 1968);
In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 542, 232 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1968); Santana v.
State, 431 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
60. MAnl. STAT. § 260.111 (1967).
[Vol. 54:362
JUVENILE COURT RULES
(a) Reference Hearing
The Minnesota requirement of clear and convincing proof
for finding grounds for reference6' should be constitutionally
adequate. The reference hearing is a serious matter wherein
the juvenile is entitled to due process protection,62 and the impo-
sition of a standard more stringent than a preponderance of the
evidence is desirable though not constitutionally required.
Even in civil cases of special gravity this type of standard
is imposed, 8 and it is hard to believe that in a matter as serious
as reference,6 4 action should be taken "on no higher degree of
proof than applies in a negligence case." 65 On the other hand,
due process should not compel imposition of the reasonable doubt
standard since that standard would impose severe problems of
proof, making it virtually impossible to get reference. Whether
"the child is not suitable to treatment or . . . the public safety
would not be served [under juvenile court jurisdiction]"66 are
not easy matters to prove under any circumstances and may be
virtually impossible under a reasonable doubt test. In addition,
this is truly a situation where the "consequences of error are
not quite so serious" 67 because the hearing is not decisive on the
merits of the controversy, and a juvenile prosecuted as an adult
will be assured of all the adult criminal protections. These fac-
tors lead to the conclusion that the standard of proof set by
the rules is both permissible and appropriate.
(b) Delinquency not Based on a Violation of Criminal Law
The recent cases requiring procedural protections for juve-
niles carefully limit themselves to consideration of the adjudi-
cation of delinquency based on a violation of criminal law. Min-
nesota 8 and most other states,69 however, also permit an adjudi-
cation of delinquency if the child is found "truant," "uncon-
trolled," or "dangerous."70  Moreover, the juvenile judge may
61. MJCR 8-7(2).
62. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
63. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
64. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
65. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276,
285 (1966).
66. MJCR 8-7(2).
67. Paulsen, supra note 27, at 563.
68. Mi. STAT. § 260.015(5) (1967).
69. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
70. Mlix. STAT. § 260.015 (5) (c)-(e) (1967).
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make the same dispositional orders which would be available if
the child had violated a criminal statute.71 Whether proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required when there
is no violation of criminal law may depend on what rationale is
chosen to require such a standard when there is such a violation.
If, in the latter situation, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is re-
quired only because of the equal protection clause, the standard
may not be constitutionally required since there is no criminal law
to use as an analogy. The juvenile could argue, of course, that
since he faces the same consequences as the juvenile who is ac-
cused of a crime, there is no rational basis for differentiating be-
tween them. This seems sound if the Urbasek result has been
accepted; if not, it has no force. In any case, if the result in Ur-
basek is required by the due process clause, the same result
should be required here. The concern in all of the juvenile due
process cases has been the potential. consequences of the adjudi-
cation-not the label given to it.72 The same stigma and, at least
potentially, the same results attach to the adjudication of delin-
quency7 3 whether or not based on a violation of the criminal
law. Moreover, this adjudication of delinquency based on
"status" is only vaguely defined and the severe sanctions avail-
able should not be lightly imposed.
One problem with the requirement of reasonable doubt may
arise in its application. Delinquency adjudications are sometimes
sought on the ground that the child is "uncontrolled"7 4 because
he needs to be taken out of the home due to neglect or de-
pendency. In that situation, the delinquency charge is employed
because the county attorney cannot get enough evidence for a
neglect charge without the parents' cooperation, and such co-
operation is usually unavailable because such a charge places
blame on the parents. The parents may, however, be willing to
cooperate with a charge of delinquency because it places the
blame on the child. Thus the county attorney-convinced that
it is better to get treatment for the child by a somewhat un-
justified means than to have him in the home-might prosecute
the child as a "wayward" delinquent.7 5 Since the higher degree
of proof would make it more difficult to obtain such adjudications,
he would argue that the benevolent use of the delinquency
71. MnI. STAT. § 260.185 (1967).
72. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 '1967).
73. MmN. STAT. § 260.185 (1967).
74. MIn N. STAT. § 260.015(5) (d) (:1967).
75. Interview with Leonard Street, Goodhue County Attorney, in
Red Wing, Minnesota, Mar. 18, 1969.
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jurisdiction would be frustrated in an actual neglect situation.
But while this procedure may be effective in some cases, it is
likely to do more harm than good. It allows parents to stigmatize
their children for the misdeeds of the parents and begins the
youth's contact with the court on a basis of dishonesty and dis-
trust.
(c) Neglect, Dependency and Termination-of-
Parental-Rights
It has been widely assumed that proceedings involving the
parents' conduct toward the child are qualitatively different from
the delinquency jurisdiction and that the parties are not en-
titled to the protections afforded in delinquency proceedings.
76
In Urbasek, the court pointed out the differences usually used
to justify this distinction.
Dependency and neglect cases are ordinarily instituted pri-
marily because of the unwillingness or inability of parents or
relatives to discharge their parental duties rather than because
of the child's misconduct. (IM. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 37, pars.
702-4 and 702-5.) While he may be removed from his parental
home, the minor's liberty may not be infringed upon by his com-
mitment to an institution designed solely for the care of delin-
quent children (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 37 par. 705-7(1) (8)),
and he is not punished or regarded as a criminal by society
which is genuinely seeking to provide him with a proper home.
Because of these differences we see no compelling reason for
requiring more than a preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof in cases of dependency or neglect which may appropri-
ately be labeled "civil" proceedings both in the legal and lay
sense of the word.17
While this would be the holding of nearly every court in the na-
tion,78 as a matter of policy if not constitutional requirement, a
standard higher than preponderance of the evidence should be re-
quired.
In certain respects, neglect, dependency and termination-of-
parental-rights proceedings are essentially different from de-
linquency proceedings, primarily because the parties stand in a
different relationship to each other. In each type of proceeding
there are three parties involved-the state, the parents and the
child. In delinquency and traffic offender proceedings, the state
76. In re Blaine, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1968).
77. 38 IM. 2d 535, 542-43, 232 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1968).
78. At least one court has upheld more stringent protections in
neglect and dependency proceedings than in a delinquency proceeding
because of the greater seriousness of the former. In re Santillanes, 47
N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
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is proceeding against the child, and -the parents' right to custody
and control coincides with their interest in protecting the rights
of the child. However, in neglect, dependency and termination-
of-parental-rights proceedings the state is proceeding on behalf of
the child and against the parents. In these proceedings, society
does not need the protection it does in the former, but acts for
the child only because he is not able to help himself.79
This difference in the proceedings is amplified when the
weight of the interests involved is considered. Where an indi-
vidual's liberty is at stake, the spectre of convicting an innocent
man has led to a conclusion that the interests of the individual
in retaining his liberty and his reputation require acquittal
unless the state proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8 0
However, this burden has not been required when the dispute is
between individuals.8 ' If that dichotomy is analogized to the
treatment of juveniles, we might say that the juvenile delin-
quency and traffic offender situations are like the criminal case
in the sense that in both situations, a balance must be struck
between the protection of society and the freedom of the individ-
ual. The same analogy would conclude that the dependency,
neglect and termination cases are like the civil suit in that the
dispute is essentially between the parent and child with the
state intervening to protect the interests of the child rather
than society generally. The parents, in attempting to retain
control and custody of their children, still have a substantially
stronger interest than does the usual defendant in a civil suit.
The interest of the parents varies with each of the types of
actions under consideration, however, and it may be that the
degree of proof required should reflect that variation.
The interest of the parents is least in dependency pro-
ceedings where stigma is less likely to attach to the adjudication
because the basis of the decision is the parents' inability, rather
than their unwillingness, to care for the child properly.8 2 More-
79. This essential difference in the relationship is recognized by
the MJCR. The interests of the parent and child are presumed to con-
flict in all neglect, dependency and termination-of-parental-rights pro-
ceedings for right to counsel and guarc~an ad litem purposes. MJCR
2-1(5).
80. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, :153, 1162 (1960).
81. For example, the state will have to prove guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in order to punish a man for battery, but to recover dam-
ages, the victim of the same battery will only have to prove the act by
a preponderance of the evidence.
82. Alum. STAT. § 260.015(6) (1967).
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over, the infringement on the parents' right to custody and con-
trol is minimized because the rules provide for regular review
of the disposition, and the parents may regain custody of the
child when the conditions leading to the adjudication are recti-
fied.83 The parents have a greater interest in the neglect pro-
ceeding. Although the dispositional features are the same as
those for dependency,8 4 there is stronger stigma attached to
the parents because an adjudication of neglect is indicative that
the parent is unwilling to care for the child even though able to
do so.8 5 This presents a greater element of culpability than does
the dependency action. A termination-of-parental-rights pro-
ceedings imposes the most severe consequences on the parents
since not only is the same stigma attached as in the case of a
neglect proceeding, but the loss of custody and control is perma-
nent and unreviewable.8 6
As suggested above, a finding of neglect should not be made
on a mere preponderance of the evidence, but this does not neces-
sarily require a reasonable doubt test. Although the conse-
quences of the adjudication may be considered extremely serious,
the interest of the child in being free from harm due to the
neglect is much stronger than the interest of society in general
in ridding itself of a particular criminal or delinquent. This
clash of interest is appropriately resolved by the application of
the clear and convincing standard imposed by the Rules.
Under the view suggested here, the fact that the invasion of
parental interest is less in a dependency proceeding while the
strength of the child's interest remains the same might lead to
requiring a lesser standard of proof in dependency cases. At
least two factors, however, militate against such a choice. First,
although the invasion of parental interest may have decreased,
it is still hardly comparable to the interests involved in the
usual civil suit and the preponderance of the evidence test would
seem inappropriate.8 7 Second, if the required degree of proof
were lower for dependency than for neglect, the end result might
well be that the neglect proceeding would simply be avoided
and applicable cases pursued under the dependency jurisdiction.
83. MJCR 6-7.
84. MINN. STAT. § 260.191 (1967).
85. M x. STAT. § 260.015 (1967).
86. M_.m. STAT. § 260.241 (1967).
87. It might be possible to impose a standard which is between
a preponderance and clear and convincing evidence, but this would
certainly be an unneeded complication to an already abstract and some-
what confused concept.
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This is presently the case to some extent because of the greater
likelihood of parental cooperation in dependency cases.88 Be-
cause of these two factors the present imposition of the clear
and convincing standard in these cases is both proper and ad-
visable.
A termination-of-parental-rights proceeding presents a some-
what more difficult question. The Rules' provision, requiring
only proof by clear and convincing evidence,89 seems unwise as a
matter of policy. The seriousness of the potential consequences
of such an adjudication is apparent. Although there is no
threat of imprisonment here, as there is in a criminal trial, it
might be argued that unconditional loss of the right to custody
and control of one's child is just as worthy of protection as is a
temporary loss of liberty. Moreover, the adjudication in a termi-
nation-of-parental-rights proceeding is final; there is no possibil-
ity of reasserting parental control upon correction of the circum-
stances leading to the termination. This makes the "consequences
of error"90 at least as high as they are in a criminal proceed-
ing. Also, a higher standard of proof does not threaten the
state's ability to protect the interest of the child, at least tem-
porarily, because when proof beyond a reasonable doubt is ab-
sent, the state may proceed under the neglect or dependency
jurisdiction.9
It may be argued that where a judge is the trier of fact, the
reasonable doubt standard is no more stringent than the clear
and convincing evidence standard.9 2 However, because the con-
88. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
89. MJCR 5-7(1) (a).
90. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 _mn. L. REv.
547, 563 (1957).
91. An adjudication of neglect or dependency may also be made
in a termination cause, thus obviating the need to initiate a new pro-
ceeding. Amn. STAT. § 260.235 (1967).
92. It may be speculated that a judge-theoretically isolated from
the psychological pressures imposed on jurors-would claim that the
standards are equivalent. If he is "clearly convinced," he may not
think any "doubt" could be reasonable, whereas a juror may be more
swayed by an intangible "feeling" that he would interpret as a reason-
able doubt.
The observations, however, would appear to contradict the assertion
that the standards are equivalent. First, the Rules provide for three
standards. Since they have chosen that of reasonable doubt in adjudi-
cations of delinquency, it may be asserted that such a standard provides
the maximum feasible protection. Secondly, the reasonable doubt
standard has had a long association with criminal trials in which all
doubts are supposed to be resolved in favor of the defendant. It may be
argued that a judge, given such a standard, would be psychologically
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sequences of termination of parental rights are as severe
as those of incarceration, policy considerations suggest that
any doubts be resolved in favor of a reasonable doubt standard.9 3
(d) Detention and Dispositional Hearings
The Rules do not specify the degree of proof required for
findings of fact at detention or dispositional hearings. Pre-
sumably, prior practice will be continued and proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence will be sufficient. Any require-
ment of a specific degree of proof may be somewhat meaning-
less for a detention hearing. As a practical matter, an erroneous
application would never be tested since an ensuing proceeding
would provide the same opportunity for rehearing as would an
appeal.9 4 Nevertheless, the preponderance standard should be
explicitly stated in the Rules. The judge should be directed
towards viewing the detention hearings as part of a judicial
process and not as a mere stopgap prior to the "real" hearings.
A formal preponderance standard might focus more attention
on the issues relevant to the decision to detain, such as the prob-
ability of running away and the severity of possible danger to
the public as opposed to the possible harm detention might cause
the child.
The preponderance standard used at the dispositional hear-
ing should also be set forth in the Rules. Such a standard is the
only one amenable to the disposition hearing. The decision is
based almost solely on investigative reports and recommenda-
tions. The question to be resolved is how the disposition order
will best help both the child and society. The facts relevant
to such a decision are impossible to "prove" beyond a reason-
able doubt and the judge should be allowed maximum dis-
cretion.
Here again, however, as a practical matter, it may be diffi-
cult to test an erroneous application. Since the judge is the sole
trier of fact and appellate courts are hesitant to upset their find-
ings, it is doubtful that many instances would arise wherein the
standard would be meaningful. The dispositional order
more receptive to the parent's arguments than if he were required only
to be clearly convinced of the state's evidence.
93. It may be that this is already accomplished to some degree by
the strong presumption in favor of leaving children with their parents.
See Klugman v. Hursch, 256 Minn. 113, 97 N.W.2d 425 (1959).
94. See also Note, Detention Procedures in the Juvenile Court
Process, 54 AMINN. L. Rnv. 409 (1969).
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would not be upset absent a clear abuse of discretion but a
written standard might provide additional impetus to a more de-
tailed analysis of the reasons for the order.9 5
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Courts have evidenced substantial uncertainty as to the
appropriate restrictions on admissibility of evidence in the juve-
nile courts. Some have held that the normal rules of evidence
do not apply to a juvenile proceeding" in order to maintain a
summary adjudication conducted in an informal manner.97 More
recently, courts and commentators have carefully considered
the need for application of rules of evidence. The majority has
concluded that at least some rules of evidence must be applied
in the juvenile courts98 and the Rules have adopted this view.,)
This discussion will make no attempt to cover the rules of
evidence comprehensively but will instead select specific pro-
visions which seem worthy of note in the general scheme. Ex-
cept where noted, it is presumed that specific rules of evidence
will be interpreted in the same manner as they have been in
other courts.
A. REcoRD ExcLUsIvTY
The Rules provide that the required decision or order in all
proceedings shall be based solely on the properly admitted evi-
dence.'00 Record exclusivity is of course essential if rules
of evidence are to have any meaning. While this requirement is
firmly imbedded in the rest of our judicial system it has not
95. The Rules presently provide for a written statement of the
reasons for the order and the facts on which those reasons were based.
MJCR 6-6.
96. Steinhauser v. State, 206 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1967);
Harter v. State, 260 Iowa 605, 149 N.W.2d 827 (1967); Campbell v. Sieg-
ler, 10 N.J. Misc. 987, 162 A. 154 (1932); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109
A.2d 523 (1954); Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
97. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 606, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954).
98. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952);
In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Mun. Ct. of App., D.C. 1953); In re Green,
123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952); In re Cromwell, 232 Md.
409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963); State ex rel. Polagi v. Ireland, 81 Mont. 144,
262 P. 172 (1927); In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954);
People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); NCCD, supra note 26,
at 51-61; STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 72-73; Paulsen, supra note 90, at
562-68.
99. MJCR 5-3.
100. MJCR 5-3, 6-5, 7-3(3) (c), 8-6.
[Vol. 54:362
JUVENILE COURT RULES
previously been expressly required in juvenile proceedings. It
is now particularly pertinent to the adjudicatory hearing, where
the basic elements of the adversary system have been re-estab-
lished by Gault.1° 1 Indeed, it would seem that the right to con-
frontation that Gault imposed on the juvenile courts would re-
quire such a provision for adjudicatory hearings in delinquency
and traffic offender cases. In other types of hearings, with the
possible exception of the dispositional hearing, any notion of the
basic fairness required by due process should suffice to require
record exclusivity. Nevertheless, the addition of the requirement
to the Rules is a wise one, necessary to preserve the fairness-
and the appearance of fairness-which is vitally important to all
juvenile proceedings.
While the requirement of record exclusivity is certainly a
salutary one, it should be recognized that in many cases it may
be of little or no practical value. In less populous counties, the
juvenile court judge might know the juvenile, his family back-
ground, reputation and record in nearly every case, and it may
be impossible for the judge to put these factors from his mind.
They must affect the credibility of the juvenile's testimony in a
marginal case. Moreover, in such situations, it would be im-
practical to disqualify the judge for prejudice because to
do so might disqualify him in nearly all juvenile cases in his
county. One factor which will tend to mitigate this unfortunate
situation is the requirement that the juvenile judge make find-
ings of fact.10 2 This requirement will tend to force the judge to
face consciously the question of whether there is enough evi-
dence, exclusive of extra-record facts, to justify an adjudication.
The requirement of findings will probably work to prevent only
the most capricious use of extra-record facts, but there is no
apparent solution to the remainder of the problem. Each judge
will have to be trusted to take careful note of his own pre-
conceived beliefs on the matter and to discount any judgments
he might have made on the basis of extra-record facts.
B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESETATION OF EvIDENCE
For detention, reference and adjudicatory hearings, the Rules
require that the county attorney present the evidence. 0 3 The
intent of these provisions is to get both the court and the pro-
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 56-57.
102. MJCR 8-7(1) (b), 6-6, 5-4(2).
103. MJCR 5-2(1), 7-3(3) (b), 8-5.
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bation officers out of the business of presenting evidence, in or-
der to eliminate the appearance that the one who is to determine
facts or prescribe treatment is an advocate for the state seeking
a "conviction." This is especially important under the adversary
proceedings prescribed by the Rules.
The Rules also provide that the judge in adjudicatory and
reference hearings not ask questions of witnesses except
when "evidence admitted is uncear in some essential re-
spect."'1 4  This merely reflects the adoption of an adversary
theory in which the judge is limited to the proper role of the
impartial trier of fact and law rather than the additional roles of
counselor, confessor,- prosecutor and social worker. In detention
hearings, no provision limits the activity of the judge and pre-
sumably he will go on as he did before, asking questions freely
of any and all witnesses.
In dispositional hearings, neither of the above rules apply.
The probation officer or another person appointed by the court
may present the evidence instead of the county attorney, and
the court may freely question witnesses.10 5 This type of flexi-
bility seems useful in that it reflects a belief that the disposi-
tional hearing should not be imbued with the adversary features
of the adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court judge must ac-
tively seek out information about the juvenile and his family in
order to choose the most appropriate disposition. Likewise, the
state's evidence should not be presented by one whose position is
primarily accusatory as is the county attorney's. However, these
features may not be desirable in all situations. When, for
example, the probation department is rigidly in favor of a par-
ticular disposition, especially commitment, and the juvenile's
attorney is vigorously opposing that disposition, it will probably
be wise for the proceeding to assume a more adversary nature.
The county attorney should present the evidence and the court
should refrain from questioning witnesses. This may make the
proceeding accusatory rather than therapeutic, but the effect will
be far better than allowing the judge, by his questioning of wit-
nesses, to appear to be attacking the child's evidence or allowing
the probation officer to appear to be trying to "put the child
away."Y
104. MJCR 5-2(1), 8-5.
105. No evidence is available as to the practices in Minnesota be-
fore the Rules, but in many parts of the country the judge freely ques-
tions both witnesses and parties. Note, supra note 69, at 795-96.
Presumably this practice was present in iMinnesota also.
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In all hearings the parties may cross-examine witnesses and
may present evidence of their own. 1° 6 To aid them in doing so,
the Rules give the parties the right to compulsory process.107
One feature of these provisions is likely to cause difficulty. The
Rules expressly provide that the parties may cross-examine the
preparer of any report, 0S causing additional difficulties for un-
dermanned and overburdened probation staffs. However, this
practice might yield a positive benefit in that the social worker
will formulate his dispositional proposal more carefully if he is
required to defend it in court. A more difficult question
is whether a party may call a social worker's informants to the
stand for examination. The Rules make no specific provision for
such action but since they permit the parties to present their
own evidence, there would seem to be no prohibition against
calling the informants. 0 9
If informants may be called to the stand, the social worker's
sources of information may evaporate. On the other hand,
since the report is often largely hearsay in nature, it does little
good to cross-examine the preparer of the report, who is merely
reporting the observations of others. The best solution is to
allow informants to be called whenever it appears to the court
that the preparer of the report is too far removed from the facts
in issue to testify knowledgeably. This will probably tend to in-
hibit the social workers' sources since many will be inhibited by
the fear of getting "involved." Those inhibited by their own
uncertainty as to their reliability, however, may not have been
proper sources in any event. The essential point is that informa-
tion from unidentified sources unavailable for cross-examina-
tion is repugnant to our system of justice, and should be used
sparingly and advisedly, if indeed at all.
C. USE OF HEARSAY AND OPINION EvINmCE
The use of hearsay and opinion evidence at the adjudicatory
hearing has been a widely discussed evidentiary problem"10
and will not be extensively discussed here. The Rules pro-
vide that the civil rules of evidence must be followed in
106. MJCR 5-2(2), 6-4, 7-3(3) (b), 8-5.
107. MJCR 2-3(1) (f).
108. MJCR 10-5(2) (a). In addition, each report filed must be
made available for inspection, MJCR 10-5 (1).
109. See generally MJCR 10-5(2).
110. See, e.g., NCCD, supra note 26, at 51-61; STAxDmAws, supra note
27, at 72-73; Paulsen, supra note 90, at 563-65; Note, supra note 69, at
794-95.
1969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the adjudicatory hearing, which means that the hearsay
rule and the rule against nonexpert opinion must be ap-
plied. Imposition of the civil rules of evidence is in keeping
with the conclusion of the vast majority of recent commentators
and courts."' In any case, simple fairness should dictate use of
strict rules of evidence. As noted by one court:
The customary rules of evidence shown by long experience as
essential to getting at the truth with reasonable certainty in
civil trials must be adhered to .... Hearsay, opinion, gossip,
bias, prejudice, trends of hostile neighborhood feeling, the hopes
and fears of social workers, are all sources of error and have no
more place in Children's Courts than in any other courts. 1 2
In all other types of juvenile proceedings, the Rules provide
that any evidence which is material and relevant may be ad-
mitted, including hearsay and opinion evidence.1 3 Apparently
most courts and commentators assume that a judge should be
able to admit nearly any evidence that he wishes, but the prob-
lem deserves somewhat closer examination.
The use of hearsay and opinion evidence is permitted in
detention, reference and dispositional hearings, as is any other
evidence which is material and relevant." 4 There may, how-
ever, be further limitations on the admission of evidence in
such circumstances. In New York, under a very similar pro-
vision, one court has commented:
However, there is another criterion besides the terms of the
statute. Even if an evidentiary question does not rise to con-
stitutional dimension and present a due process issue, the Court
has an inherent obligation to exercise its discretion as to the
admission of evidence in a manner to insure fairness to the indi-
viduals and the trustworthiness of its deliberations." 5
This court-imposed "fairness" rule excludes some of the most un-
reliable evidence such as simple gossip, rumor or other evidence
completely without foundation. The same rule should be fol-
lowed in the Minnesota juvenile courts in those situations where
the rules merely require that evidence be material and relevant
in order to be admitted.
The most prominent form of hearsay and opinion evidence
which will be admitted in these hearings is a social study,"0
111. See, e.g., Note, supra note 69.
112. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932).
113. MJCR 6-5, 7-3(3) (c), 8-6.
114. MJCR 6-5, 7-3 (3) (c), 8-6.
115. In re Blaine, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1967).
116. MJCR 10-1(3). A social study is "an investigation of the per-
sonal and family history and the environment of a child." MJCR 10-1
(1).
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medical study,11 traffic offense study 18 or a reference study.119
The social study is not admissible in an adjudicatory hearing,
but is admissible in a dispositional hearing.1 20 The medical and
traffic offender reports are inadmissible in any hearing except
the dispositional.121  A reference study, however, can be
ordered at any time after the filing of the petition in a delin-
quency cause and is admissible at the reference hearing if one is
heldu 2 and in the adjudicatory hearing in a neglect, dependency
or termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.1 23  The parties are
entitled to inspect any of the reports admitted in evidence 1 24 and
to cross-examine those who prepare such reports.
25
At the detention hearing there are no reports available, but
the Rules nevertheless leave the door open for the admission of
other hearsay and opinion evidence. 26  This would seem to be
at best a dangerous practice since the detention hearing is not
an adjudication on the merits and will not in any way determine
the outcome of the case. However, any chance of the rehabili-
tation program's success will be substantially affected by the
child's attitude toward his detention. If, in his initial contact
with the court, the child is detained by the court on the basis of
unreliable evidence, it is not difficult to foresee that the child
will view the fairness of the entire process with some skepticism.
Moreover, the Rules make no provision for the child to re-
quest a judge for the adjudicatory hearing different from the
one who ordered him detained, as they do in an analogous situ-
ation in the reference hearing. 27 This means that after receiving
an unlimited amount of hearsay and opinion evidence at the
detention hearing and forming an opinion of the child on the
basis of the opinion of others, the judge is permitted to preside
117. MJCR 10-2(3). A medical examination includes both phy-
sical and mental examinations, MJCR 10-2(1), and may be ordered
after adjudication when the physical or mental condition of the child
or parent is a relevant issue and the subject consents to it.
118. MJCR 10-3(3). A traffic offense study is merely an investiga-
tion of the child's traffic offense record. MJCR 10-3 (1).
119. MJCR 10-4(3). A reference study is an investigation of the
child's juvenile court record and the circumstances surrounding the
current charge. MJCR 10-4(1).
120. MJCR 10-1(3).
121. MJCR 10-2(3), 10-3(3).
122. MJCR 10-4(3).
123. MJCR 10-4(3).
124. MJCR 10-5(1).
125. MJCR 10-5(2).
126. MJCR 7-3(3) (c).
127. MJCR 8-8(2).
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over the adjudicatory hearing where hearsay and opinion evi-
dence are supposedly excluded. 128 Such a practice would seem
to limit the effectiveness of exclusion in the adjudicatory hearing.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the provi-
sions for admission of hearsay and opinion evidence in the de-
tention hearing will have a detrimental effect under the present
structure of the Rules. While some procedure is probably needed
for presentation of testimony from witnesses who cannot be pres-
ent, it should be accomplished by the use of more reliable forms
of testimony such as affidavits. In its present form, the rule
goes too far, in that it permits all manner of unreliable evidence
to be admitted. The rule should be amended to allow ad-
mission only of the specific types of evidence needed for a proper
determination, such as conditions in the child's home, though
such evidence may not be admitted under normal rules of evi-
dence.
The same general criticism may be made of the provision
governing admissibility of evidence in a reference hearing.120 In
fact, this broad provision for admissibility is of even more du-
bious wisdom than that of the detention hearing because
of the gravity of the reference hearing. 30 Here, at minimum,
the juvenile is threatened with the loss of the record protection
provisions allowed by the Rules' 3 1 -a consequence too serious to
occur on the basis of simple hearsay or opinion evidence.
As in the case of the detention hearing, the rule presents
the danger that a judge will receive hearsay and opinion evi-
dence about the juvenile in the reference hearing and then pre-
side at the adjudicatory hearing where hearsay and opinion are
supposedly excluded.13 2 This danger may be avoided when the
state requests reference and the court denies it, because the ju-
venile then is entitled to request a different judge.13 3 But when
the juvenile moves for reference, this provision affords the
juvenile no protection. 3 4
128. MJCR 5-3 (1).
129. MJCR 8-6.
130. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
131. MJCR art. 11.
132. MJCR 5-3(1).
133. MJCR 8-6.
134. MJCR 8-6. The juvenile is, of course, still entitled to have thejudge disqualified for prejudice. This raises an interesting question as
to whether the fact that the judge has heard testimony which is inad-
missible at the adjudicatory hearing would constitute sufficient preju-
dice for disqualification.
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It is possible that the reason for permitting hearsay and opin-
ion evidence at the reference hearing is to allow admission of the
reference report.135 This would seem unlikely, however, since it
would certainly be easy to make specific provision for admission
of the report without throwing the doors open to other evi-
dence.136 It is submitted that the rule goes too far and should
be carefully revised to limit its scope.
The admission of incompetent evidence at the dispositional
hearing' 37 is perhaps the most unfortunate feature of the evi-
dentiary provisions in the Rules. The dispositional hearing
can be the most important part of the juvenile process. 38
Whether the charge is admitted, as in most juvenile cases, or is
denied, disposition is the most crucial question in the case.3
When the court adjudicates a child delinquent, a broad range of
consequences is still possible. 40 At this stage, the court is left
with choices that range from a verbal "slap on the wrist" to ex-
tended commitment. 41 An analogous situation is present in
neglect, dependency 142 and termination-of-parental-rights pro-
ceedings.1 43 With such a broad range of alternatives available to
the court, it is curious that the choice should be made on the
basis of evidence not normally considered reliable. 44 Yet this is
the position taken by the Rules and the majority of juvenile
courts.1
45
The social study is one prominent form of evidence admissi-
ble at a dispositional hearing though it would be inadmissible
at an adjudicatory hearing.46 Monrad Paulsen has suggested a
possible reason for permitting the use of these predominantly
hearsay reports in dispositional proceedings:
[A]n adjudication of delinquency will usually turn on a narrow
question of fact, i.e., did the youngster perform the act of
of delinquency and, therefore, it will be feasible to bring in the
135. See note 110 supra.
136. In fact the Rules contain such a provision already. MJCR
10-4(3).
137. MJCR 6-4(1).
138. Paulsen, supra note 90, at 567.
139. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 802 (1966).
140. See AlmN. STAT. § 260.185 (1967).
141. Mhm. STAT. § 260.185 (1967).
142. Mwn . STAT. § 260.191 (1967).
143. Mw. STAT. § 260.241 (1967).
144. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Anl . L. REv.
547, 567 (1957).
145. Id. at 566.
146. MJCR 10-1(3).
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few witnesses necessary while the question of disposition may
turn on a great range of factors, many of which are deeply
imbedded in subjective judgment.147
The Rules recognize the danger in admitting the social study and
carefully provide for disclosure and cross-examination of the
preparer of the report.148 Yet, of the incompetent evidence ad-
missible at the dispositional hearing, the reports are perhaps the
most reliable. The Rules apparently permit the state to bring the
neighborhood busybody to the stand to testify that she thinks the
child is evil or dangerous because she "heard" that he had beaten
up the son of her best friend's next door neighbor. While the
social study may be necessary for a proper disposition of a ju-
venile court case, no reason is apparent for permitting the ad-
mission of even less reliable forms of evidence. It certainly
should not be necessary in order to provide for the admission of
the social study. The Rules should provide that the normal rules
of evidence will apply to the dispositional hearing with a specific
exception made for admission of any studies ordered by the court.
D. USE OF EvIDENcE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
1. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is discussed else-
where in this symposium and will not be dealt with here. Suf-
fice it to say that Gault requires its application in delinquency
proceedings where there is a possibility of incarceration. The
Rules provide that evidence and any fruits thereof obtained in
violation of the privilege must be excluded in the adjudicatory
hearing.149
2. The Privilege Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure
To effectuate the fourth amen.dment's'5 0 right to freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has
developed an accompanying exclusionary rule'51 which, essen-
tially, prohibits the prosecutor from using state evidence ob-
147. Paulsen, supra note 144, at 566-37.
148. MJCR 10-5.
149. MJCR 2-2 (2).
150. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... " U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
151. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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tained by an illegal search or seizure in either a state or federal
criminal prosecution. 5 2
The Rules do not expressly require application of the ex-
clusionary rule to the juvenile courts. Moreover, since the Rules
require application of civil rules of evidence, 53 and the search
and seizure rule is applicable only to criminal prosecutions,'5 4
it might be argued that the Rules were intended to avoid appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule. It seems apparent, however, that
application of the exclusionary rule will be constitutionally re-
quired in the juvenile courts as it is in adult courts. Clearly
children have a right to be free of unreasonable search and
seizure, and as with adults, the customary way to safeguard
that right is by excluding the tainted evidence. 55 The argu-
ment that the prohibition is not constitutionally required because
the juvenile proceeding is civil 55 in nature has been suffi-
ciently discredited as to delinquency proceedings so that it may
be rejected out of hand. 57 As to neglect, dependency and termi-
nation-of-parental-rights proceedings, the argument is much
stronger because the proceedings are not held in lieu of criminal
prosecution. Nevertheless, they are still prosecutions by the state
in an attempt to deprive persons of substantial constitutional
rights such as custody and control of their children and the
rationale of the exclusionary rule remains applicable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rules have gone beyond the constitutional standards
imposed by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for any
adjudication of delinquency, regardless of whether the charge
would be a crime if committed by an adult. Since the conse-
quences of adult and juvenile adjudication may be comparable,
152. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
153. MJCR 5-3(1).
154. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Sackler v. Sackler, 229
N.Y.S.2d 61, 16 App. Div. 2d 423 (1962); see also Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921).
The exclusionary rule is applicable by its terms only to criminal
prosecutions, and all of the Supreme Court cases thus far have been
criminal prosecutions. However, there is some authority for applying
the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings as well. Rocco v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963).
155. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15Q. See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 & n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
157. In Te Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966).
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this is certainly a sound requirement. Likewise, where the con-
sequences are not as serious, as in neglect and dependency
cases, the requirement of clear and convincing evidence is de-
signed to retain the desired less fo:rmal atmosphere. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the seriousness of a determination to
terminate parental rights lies closer to an adjudication of delin-
quency in its stigma and finality and the clear and convincing
evidence standard should be replaced by the reasonable doubt
standard.
Following the juvenile court's trend toward a more adver-
sary proceeding, the Rules have provided for the presentation of
evidence by a county attorney and cross examination of witnesses.
Removal of the judge from the role of both counselor and prose-
cutor properly redefines his role as an arbiter and may well
alleviate the child's tendency to feel. that the "system" is against
him. However, excepting adjudicatory hearings, much of the evi-
dence presented to the court at present might consist of hearsay
and opinion, with no true gauge of its reliability. Thus, the rules
of evidence should be amended to exclude such evidence except
where the judge, exercising proper discretion, requests the ad-
mission of a report prepared by responsible parties. This would
go far towards eliminating much of the capricious "evidence"
presently used in determining a child's fate.
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